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Lost in Numbers? 
Anchoring Effects in Advertising Claims and Product Information 
Summary 
According to anchoring theory, if unsure, human beings are predisposed to treat the first 
information they see as a starting point when making a judgement. This, often sub-conscious 
process, means random information can influence decisions in ways consumers are often 
unaware of. This paper tests this principle in advertising contexts to understand how 
anchoring may affect the way consumers interpret numbers within marketing messages. The 
results support the semantic priming and semantic anchoring models, which predict that 
random numbers will bias estimates when the wording of the ‘anchor’ is similar to the object 
of the estimate. We present evidence that this is the case even when the information is not 
directly relevant to the task. Contrastingly, no evidence is found to support the ‘simple 
numeric priming’ view of anchoring, which predicts that entirely abstract information can 
bias estimates.  
 
1. Introduction 
Anchoring is defined in the behavioural economics literature as the human predisposition to 
treat a provided number, or other value, as a starting point when making a judgement 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Research into anchoring disproportionately focuses on 
reference prices. An example would be the £450 original price with a line through it, which 
makes a designer handbag seem like a bargain at £100. This aspect of anchoring has been 
heavily researched and robustly demonstrated. On the other hand, price information is only 
one part of anchoring. All kinds of numerical values (Furnham and Boo, 2011) or even 
images (Madzharov and Block, 2010) can engender anchoring effects, which is why 
understanding non-price anchors is equally important (Yadav, 1994).  
 
Anchoring bias can be extremely wide-ranging and even entirely irrelevant anchors in 
product information can influence consumer perceptions (Yun, 2010, Madzharov and Block, 
2010). Such effects are well understood with regard to reference prices, but the rather less 
extensive research in other areas suggests anchors may have far broader implications in 
marketing and advertising contexts than existing Marketing research suggests.  
 
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to provide insight into how anchoring biases may 
affect the way consumers interpret numbers within marketing messages while perusing the 
retail aisle or browsing for products online. In particular, the study tests (a) whether a claim 
on a product label might affect consumers’ estimates about adjacent products’ characteristics; 
(b) whether arbitrary numbers in product information can influence guesses about the price of 
the product or about other product properties; and (c) whether implausibly extreme 
advertising claims are in fact more effective than bold but more plausible claims.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Origins of the Anchoring Effect   
Anchoring is a bias exerted by initially presented values upon decisions made under 
uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The theory challenges the assumptions of 
classical economics, which assumes that, given access to all the information, consumers make 
rational choices. In contrast, anchoring suggests that human beings have neither the time nor 
capacity to process all the information they are exposed to, and regularly treat the first 
 
 
information they see as a starting point for attempting an estimate or making a judgement  
(ibid).  
In the decades since the first anchoring effects were demonstrated (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974), numerous experiments have reported similar findings (e.g., Epley and Gilovich, 2001; 
McElroy and Dowd, 2007; Mussweiler and Strack, 2001). Experiments demonstrate that 
anchoring biases are particularly acute in cases where the true value is unclear (Van Exel et 
al., 2006). 
Although some have questioned such experiments’ external validity (Wu et al. 2008), 
anchoring research has been applied in a wide variety of settings from forecasting, 
management, negotiation and judicial sentencing to marketing and advertising (Furnham and 
Boo, 2011). 
 
2.2. Anchoring Research in Marketing and Advertising   
Anchoring research in marketing literature is mostly concerned with its influence on 
consumers’ price sensitivity. Several studies show how reference prices are used effectively 
to influence consumers’ estimates of the value of products and services (Biswas et al., 1993; 
Northcraft and Neale, 1987; Ariely et al., 2003). While price anchoring is well established, 
this is less the case for other potential applications (Yadav, 1994; Yun, 2010; Wilson et al., 
1996).   
Among limited research on non-price anchoring, Wansink et al. (1998) present empirical 
evidence that non-price anchoring in advertisements can exert a powerful, measurable 
influence on consumer buying behaviour. Furthermore, Madzharov and Block (2010) show 
that imagery on product packaging (such as the number of pretzels pictured on the bag) can 
anchor consumers’ estimates of the amount of product contained inside − proving it is 
possible for biases to be recorded using anchoring cues on product packaging. Yun (2010) 
was able to bias participants’ preferences simply by modifying the model number on a 
product. Yun reports that participants rated a fictitious ‘Dell Studio 81’ laptop more 
favourably than an identical laptop marked ‘Dell Studio 18’ laptop. These findings suggest 
that even entirely arbitrary anchors in product information may alter participants’ evaluation 
of products.  
Non-price studies generally follow a methodological framework distinct from studies 
concerned with price. This is important, because non-price related anchoring information is 
often secondary in comparison to price, which is a central preoccupation of the consumer. In 
many cases it is therefore preferable to introduce the anchor values incidentally instead of 
asking participants to focus on the anchor value (Critcher and Gilovich, 2008; Wilson et al., 
1996). For example, while it may be appropriate to ask estate agents whether they would 
value a property at more or less than the reference price (given that prices are compared and 
discussed all the time in the real estate profession), it would be a different matter to ask a 
consumer if they would give a Dell laptop a higher or lower favourability rating than the 
product model number. The latter would lack external validity since it is far removed from 
the consumer’s natural thought process when evaluating products. The fact that biases have 
been observed without prompting by the experimenter, suggests anchoring may be relevant in 
real world retail settings. 
 
 
There is therefore considerable scope to build upon previous non-price studies. Specifically, 
more research is needed to understand the extent to which anchoring may distort consumers’ 
evaluation of products. Few papers have researched this issue, which is surprising given the 
bold, numerical nature of some claims, for example: 
● A deodorant that claims to last for up to 96 hours (Right Guard Xtreme Dry, 2015); 
● An energy drink that claims to boost energy for up to five hours (5-Hour Energy 
drink range, 2015); and  
● A moisturiser that claims to hydrate skin for up to 7 days (Garnier 7-Day body lotion, 
2013). 
 
While this has been explored outside the anchoring literature, studies have centred largely on 
rational decision making, for example establishing a link between brand reputation and 
consumer trust in evaluating bold or exaggerated claims (Goldberg and Hartwick, 1990) or 
the importance of evidence to support consumers to make informed choices (Xie and Boush, 
2011; Marks and Kamins, 1988). 
 
2.3. The Psychology of Anchoring    
While anchoring effects have been repeatedly demonstrated over forty years, the underlying 
mechanisms are only partially understood.  
Anchoring is in fact now thought to be ‘an umbrella concept’ for several mechanisms, which 
determine the effect depending on the context (Epley, 2004). Four key theories, which 
attempt to explain anchoring in different contexts include: (i) insufficient adjustment 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974); (ii) selective accessibility (Epley and Gilovich, 2001, 2005); 
(iii) attitude change (Wegener et al., 2001); and (iv) priming (Wong and Kwong, 2000; 
Mussweiler and Strack, 1999). 
 
(i) Insufficient adjustment  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) initially proposed anchoring to be the result of a two-stage 
anchoring and adjustment process. Insufficient adjustment is primarily useful for 
understanding the anchoring effect in situations where anchors are self-generated (Epley and 
Gilovich, 2001). In marketing, an example would be a consumer in the market for a new car. 
He or she might estimate the price by adjusting upwards from the price of the previous model 
(Epley, 2004). 
 
Experiments concerned with self-generated anchors normally measure the anchoring effect 
using a two-step question, known as the standard anchoring paradigm (Epley and Gilovich, 
2006). Participants are first asked to estimate the anchor value. For example Wansink et al. 
(1998) presented shoppers with a special offer for a series of grocery items before asking 
them to self-generate an anchor in the form of the question ‘How many units of this product 
do you usually buy?’ This is followed by an absolute question. In this example it was ‘How 
many units will you buy today?’ The results are then compared against a control group (who 
are only shown the absolute question). 
 
(ii) Selective accessibility  
The insufficient adjustment thesis becomes difficult to sustain in some circumstances – for 
example, when the anchor is implausible (Kahneman, 2011). The ‘selective accessibility’ 
model redressed some of these gaps in understanding (Chapman and Johnson, 1999; 
 
 
Mussweiler and Strack, 2001). Its premise is that, when attempting an estimate, our minds’ 
first recourse is to recall any information available to support the anchor value presented – a 
process defined as hypothesis-consistent testing (Mussweiler and Strack, 2001). Thus, when 
participants must ‘consider the opposite’ (i.e. think of reasons why the anchor should be 
rejected) they present with reduced biases estimates (Chapman and Johnson, 1994). The 
selective accessibility model is particularly useful in explaining the effect of provided 
anchors.  
Experiments exploring the effects of ‘provided’ anchors sometimes follow the standard 
anchoring paradigm formula in which the effect is measured by a two-part question. First, the 
participant is required to make a comparative assessment (e.g. ‘Do you think the car is worth 
more or less than 40,000 German Marks?’) Next, participants must make an absolute 
judgement such as ‘How much is the car worth?’ (Mussweiler et al., 2000).  
Selective accessibility can also explain anchoring biases when the anchors are introduced 
incidentally. For example, consumers are not asked to consider the reference price in a store, 
although its presence influences perceptions; not only about a product’s value, but also, by 
comparison, about the value of surrounding products (Nunes and Boatwright, 2004).  
(iii) Attitude change  
The ‘attitude change’ principle may help explain some aspects not addressed by other 
theories of anchoring. Findings by Wegener et al. (2001) suggest that extremely exaggerated 
or implausible anchors can be counterproductive i.e. less effective than a more modest 
anchor. They propose that this is because extremely implausible anchors trigger the mind to 
form counter-arguments that balance the influence of the anchor. For example, using the 
standard anchoring paradigm, participants were asked questions such as ‘Was Ernest 
Hemingway older or younger than 2 years old when he wrote his first novel?’ and found that 
the anchoring effect was often weaker than when the more plausible anchors were used (e.g. 
16 years) (Wegener et al., 2001).  
 
 
(iv) Priming  
A fourth perspective is that anchors engender a priming effect. There is significant 
disagreement among scholars surrounding the nature of priming effects in anchoring. In 
particular, Strack and Mussweiler (1997) attribute anchoring with a ‘semantic priming’ effect, 
having found biases to be particularly strong when the anchor is on the same a scale as the 
target response. For example, a height value, known to be arbitrary (e.g. 150 metres), exerted 
a strong influence over estimates of the height of the Brandenburg Gate, but not over width 
estimates. Extending this principle to situations in which the object of the judgement is 
different, Frederick and Mochon (2012) show how estimates of a giraffe’s weight were 
directionally biased after first estimating a racoon’s weight.  
However, research in other areas indicates that entirely abstract values can bias estimates. 
Some experiments have found that simply seeing an anchor prompts people to consider 
numbers close to the anchor value. In one study participants’ estimates of how much they 
would spend at a restaurant were influenced by whether the restaurant was named ‘‘Studio 
17’’ or ‘‘Studio 97.’’ Meanwhile, the number on an athlete’s jersey biased percentage 
estimates about his performance in the next game. Seeing the random number is believed to 
 
 
increase the accessibility of similar numbers, thereby influencing participants’ estimates 
(Critcher and Gilovich, 2008). Findings by Chapman and Bornstein (1996) and Wong and 
Kwong (2000) support this view.  
There appears to be some variety in the approach to experiments into priming effects, with 
some following the standard anchoring paradigm, more often associated with the selective 
accessibility model. However, it is open to question whether this two-step question format 
has sufficient external validity (Wu et al., 2008).  
Indeed, studies into priming effects have used ‘incidentally introduced’ anchors (Yun, 2010; 
Critcher and Gilovich, 2008). In this way, when exploring priming effects, researchers have 
tended to introduce the anchor within an image or text without drawing attention to it or 
requesting a direct comparison. The anchoring bias is then measured by comparing responses 
between high and low anchor experimental groups. Since this method limits intervention by 
the researcher, it has been associated with less powerful effects than ‘provided’ anchors 
(Wilson et al., 1996). 
 
2.4. Research Hypotheses  
Informed with this literature review, a set of hypotheses were developed to test the extension 
of anchoring bias in advertising and product information contexts and how this may affect the 
consumer decision making process. Our first hypothesis will attempt to contribute to under-
researched non-price anchoring research. In particular, given that a random social security 
card number has been proven to influence price estimates in an auction setting (Ariely et al., 
2003), we will explore whether irrelevant anchors exert an effect  in the consumer decision 
making process: 
 
H1: When participants are shown a product and asked to estimate how much they 
would expect to have to pay for it, the price will be biased towards prominent but 
irrelevant numbers in the advertising. 
 
The second hypothesis will challenge the theoretical position that any number can cause 
anchoring bias. Research by Critcher and Gilovich (2008) succeeded in influencing estimates 
of an athlete’s performance simply by altering the number on their jersey. In much the same 
way, we will test whether an entirely irrelevant number on a product label can influence the 
consumer decision making process about unrelated product characteristics:  
 
H2: When participants are shown a product and asked to estimate one of its 
properties, estimates will be biased towards prominent but irrelevant numbers on 
the packaging. 
 
The third hypothesis will test whether a numeric advertising claim on one product will bias  
consumers’ estimates of a characteristic of the non-related adjacent product when the 
message is semantically similar. Given that Yun (2010) found the model number on a laptop 
can influence perceptions of the product; we will test whether such affects can also occur 
between adjacent products. In our questions, the anchors will use similar wording as the 
target of the estimate, to attempt to achieve findings similar to studies in which semantically 
related anchors have resulted in powerful effects (Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Mussweiler 
and Strack, 2001; Frederick and Mochon, 2012) by extending the research into the consumer 
decision making process area:  
 
 
H3: When participants are shown a product and asked to estimate one of its 
properties, estimates will be biased towards prominent but semantically relevant 
numbers on non-related adjacent products. 
 
The fourth hypothesis will also test whether a semantically relevant anchor can bias 
consumers’ estimates of a characteristic of an adjacent product; however in this case the two 
products will be in the same product category and the anchor characteristic will be the same 
as the target characteristic. If demonstrated, this may have ramifications for advertisers, who 
would not want competitors to benefit from their products’ claims. Similarly, brand managers 
may wish to consider anchoring biases when negotiating shelf position with retailers. Since 
the two products are similar in this case, it is anticipated that any observed bias will follow 
the ‘hypothesis consistent testing’ process described within the selective accessibility model 
(Mussweiler and Strack, 1999). Unlike semantic priming models of anchoring, this process is 
most applicable when consumers consciously consider the anchor due to its contextual 
relevance:  
 
H4: When participants are shown a product and asked to estimate one of its 
properties, estimates will be biased towards prominent relevant numbers on similar 
adjacent products. 
 
The fifth hypothesis will explore if anchoring impacts on the consumer decision making 
process when consumers encounter implausibly extreme advertising claims. Building on the 
‘attitude change’ model by Wegener et al. (2001), it will be tested whether consumers are less 
affected when an extreme anchor is used than a bold but more plausible anchor. . 
Contrastingly, if an effect is observed it may lend credibility to selective accessibility 
proponents, who have demonstrated anchoring effects with implausibly extreme anchors 
(Chapman and Johnson, 1994; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999), but this time extending the 
research into the consumer decision making process: 
 
H5: When participants are shown a product and asked to estimate one of its 
properties, estimates will be biased towards relevant, but improbably extreme claims 
on the packaging. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
Taking a quantitative approach, an online questionnaire was administered between April and 
May 2014, which is similar to previous anchoring studies (e.g. Sleeth-Keppler, 2013; 
Simmons and Leboeuf, 2010). CINT UK Limited, an accredited market research agency, 
distributed the questionnaires. CINT assigned its members of over 80 target group panels 
representing a balance of the UK consumer segments to complete the survey. 
 
Although a non-probability sampling method was undertaken, quotas for gender and age 
helped to ensure heterogeneity. Furthermore, invitations were sent out proportionally 
according to the UK census, to ensure geographical balance in the sample. The broad range 
of consumer segments recruited led to a considerable diversity in our sample. Consequently, 
156 UK adult consumers drawn from England, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland 
participated in the research (Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Sample distribution 
Gender 
Male 52%;     Female 48% 
 
Age  
18-24: 13%  
25-34: 18%  
35-44: 18%  
45-54: 17%  
55-64: 15%  
65+: 19%  
 
Occupation 
Homemaker: 9% 
Studies: 9% 
Full time work: 26% 
Part time work: 13% 
Own business: 5% 
Retired: 25% 
Unemployed: 13% 
 
 
 
Data collection was conducted in two phases. First, as recommended by Jacowitz and 
Kahneman (1995), formal research began with a calibration survey (n=50). This was largely 
the same as the subsequent experimental questionnaires, except the numerical advertising 
claims (anchors) were omitted from product images. Then, the estimates collected during the 
calibration phase were used to set anchor values within the product images for two 
experimental questionnaires (high and low anchor) at pre-determined percentiles (Jacowitz 
and Kahneman, 1995).   
 
4.1. Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire followed a single factor, independent group design. The dependent 
variable was participants’ estimates about a characteristic (e.g. price of a lamp) of a series of 
pictured products. The independent variable was a random numerical anchor in each image 
(e.g. a notice about the wattage of the lamp light bulb), manipulated across two conditions 
(high anchor and low anchor). Differences between the two groups were measured to test the 
hypotheses. Detailed information for scenarios used to test each hypothesis is presented in 
Appendix 1.   
 
For Hypotheses 1 to 4, anchors were set at the 90
th
 percentile of the calibration group 
estimates in the high anchor questionnaire and at the 10
th
 percentile in the low questionnaire. 
Anchors were introduced incidentally (Critcher and Gilovich, 2008), meaning participants 
were not directed to consider the claims − as in the real world (Wu et al., 2008). 
 
Hypothesis 5 tested an exaggerated claim in comparison to a bold, but more plausible claim. 
Therefore, the low anchor was set at the 90
th
 percentile (as per the high condition in H1-4). 
There is no fixed method for setting implausible anchors (Wegener et al., 2001). In our 
experiment the extreme high anchor was set at 3 times the 90
th
 percentile anchor value. The 
 
 
21-hour claim used was dramatically higher than boldest energy drink claim found advertised 
in the UK (5-Hour Energy, 2014).  
 
Hypothesis 5 was tested following the standard anchoring paradigm, in which participants 
directly consider the claim before entering an estimate (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
 
The research respondents were asked to rate the believability of the claim (1=‘Completely 
believable; 5= Completely unbelievable’) before estimating the true average value. This 
ensured they understood they were required to critically appraise the claim when formulating 
an estimate rather than simply enter the claim value as an estimate.  
 
The experimental body of the questionnaire, relating to the hypotheses under investigation, 
included five primary questions. For each primary question, participants had to estimate a 
characteristic of a pictured product, for example: ‘How many hours would you expect the 
mouthwash to keep your mouth feeling fresh?’  
 
As with a study by Epley and Gilovich (2001), participants were also asked to explain in their 
own words how they arrived at their guesses after entering each estimate (a 140 character 
limit ensured manageable data analysis). This approach helped to understand whether 
participants had considered the random numbers, without drawing attention to the anchors. 
 
Products and brand names were fictitious, designed using graphics software. This was to 
avoid the effect of other factors, since, for example, brand trust has been shown to be a 
moderator of product claim effectiveness (Goldberg and Hartwick, 1990).  
 
In addition to experimental questions, a set of moderating factor questions were designed. 
Past research suggests individual factors such as mood (Bodenhausen et al., 2000) and 
intelligence (Bergman et al., 2010) may affect biases so an individual factor of specific 
relevance to this study was investigated − advertising scepticism. Participants completed the 
nine-question, 5-point SKEP scale, a measure of this variable. The SKEP scale has performed 
well against several internal validity tests (Obermiller and Spangenberg, 1998).  Responses 
were coded as 1=strongly agree (least sceptical); 5=strongly disagree. Further, previous 
studies suggest a link between relevant experience and lower biases; so we asked the 
participants to record how frequently they used similar products after entering each estimate 
on a 7-point usage frequency Likert item (1=Never, 7=Multiple times each day), (Horn et al., 
2011). This data was not requested for H4 since the scale was not appropriate for the product. 
 
4. Research Findings 
4.1. Simple Numeric Priming Effects on Price Estimates (H1)  
We tested a null hypothesis of ‘no difference’ against our hypothesis that when shown a 
product and asked to estimate how much they would expect to have to pay for it, participants’ 
estimates would be biased towards irrelevant numbers in the advertising. There was no 
significant difference between the high and low anchor conditions (Mann-Whitney U=1244; 
two tailed p=.31; n=53 in each group). Therefore, the null hypothesis, that the two groups 
were the same, is retained. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics, Hypothesis 1 
  Anchors       Medians  Transformed Medians  
 Calibration 
median 
Low 
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Low  
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Low           
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Question        
Table lamp: How 
much would you 
expect to pay 
£30 
 
10 watt bulb 60 watt bulb £20 £25 .196 .372 
 
This outcome is consistent with respondents’ explanations for their estimates. The analysis of 
their comments revealed four common response types as in Figure 1 (n=53 in each group). 
The largest proportion of participants reflected on their personal knowledge of the cost of 
similar products, or on past purchases. Around a quarter were unsure how they arrived at their 
estimate, which was coded as ‘pure guess’.  ‘Quality judgements’ were direct appraisals of 
the product without further elaboration. Examples include ‘looks cheap’ or ‘nothing overly 
special’. The absence of any mention of the random anchor (the wattage of the light bulb) is 
in line with the interpretation that the irrelevant anchor was ignored.  
 
Figure 1: Explanations for participants' estimates (‘expect to pay’, table lamp) 
 
 
 
4.2. Simple Numeric Priming and Irrelevant Product Information (H2)  
We tested the null hypothesis of ‘no difference’ against our hypothesis that when shown a 
product and asked to estimate one of its properties, participants’ estimates would be biased 
towards prominent but irrelevant numbers on the packaging. There was no significant 
difference between the high and low anchor conditions (Mann-Whitney U=1293; two tailed 
p=.48; n=53 in each group). Therefore, the null hypothesis, that the two groups were the 
same, is retained.  
  
 
 
 
 Table 3. Summary statistics, Hypothesis 2 
  
 
The insignificant result is reaffirmed by the respondents’ justifications for their estimates 
(n=53 in each group). The analysis of their comments revealed three categories (Figure 2).  
The majority of participants appeared to be totally unsure how much sugar went into a glass 
of lemonade, which was coded as ‘pure guess’. ‘Calculated guesses’ made some attempt at 
rational estimation e.g. ‘I'm assuming 6g of sugar per 100g, and a 200 ml glass’.  
‘Comparisons with similar drinks’ were common, for example ‘Coke has about 40 so I 
guessed it would be a little less than that’. However, none of the respondents mentioned the 
prize claim, indicating they did not consider the irrelevant number when making their 
estimates. 
 
 
Figure 2: Explanations for participants' estimates (grams of sugar, Lemon Drink) 
 
 
              Anchors              Medians  Transformed medians  
 Calibration 
median 
Low 
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Low 
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Low           
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Question        
Lemon drink: 
The amount of 
sugar in an 
average glass 
10 gr 2 prizes 86 prizes 8 gr 8 gr .431 .431 
 
 
4.3. Semantic Priming Effects between Products in Different Categories (H3)  
We tested our null hypothesis of ‘no difference’ against our hypothesis that when shown a 
product and asked to estimate one of its properties, participants’ estimates would be biased 
towards prominent semantically related numbers on non-related adjacent products. Our 
analysis suggests that responses in the high condition were indeed considerably above those 
in the low anchor condition, and the difference was highly significant (Mann-Whitney 
U=990; two tailed p=.006; n=53 in each group). 
 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics, Hypothesis 3 
 
The bias recorded appeared to be primarily among the high anchor group. In fact, while the 
low anchor group median estimates were well below those in the high group (Table 4), they 
were slightly above the calibration group median (5 and 4 hours respectively), suggesting that 
low anchor group participants were not drawn towards the 1-hour claim.  It should be 
highlighted that the negative skew in the data may also have contributed to the imbalance. 
Specifically, the 10
th
 percentile of calibration group (our 1-hour low anchor value) was far 
closer to the median calibration group response (4 hours) than the 90
th
 percentile high anchor 
(12 hours). Furthermore, because the low anchor was at 1-hour (near zero), participants could 
not estimate below the anchor value. Contrastingly, several participants estimated above the 
anchor value in the high condition. There was thus far less scope for anchoring biases in the 
negative direction. Nevertheless the overall highly significant anchoring bias is particularly 
striking given the two products were different.  
 
The result is relevant to the underlying mechanisms of anchoring. The difference between 
this result and that of Hypothesis 2 is especially noteworthy. While both questions involved 
unrelated anchors, the anchor used on the adjacent deodorant spray in this experiment 
involved an anchor that was semantically the same as the target question about the 
mouthwash (the deodorant promised ‘ Up to x hours of freshness’, while participants were 
asked to estimate ‘how many hours the mouthwash would keep your mouth feeling fresh’). 
On the other hand, the question asked on the lemonade (‘how many grams of sugar..?’) was 
semantically different from the anchor (‘x number of prizes to be won’).  
 
The degree of influence goes beyond what participants appeared to have been conscious of. 
When asked how they arrived at their estimates, participants’ responses were grouped into 
five categories as in Figure 3 (n=53 in each group).  
 
 
               Anchors        Medians  Transformed medians  
 Calibration 
median 
Low 
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Low 
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Low           
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Question        
Mouthwash: 
Number of hours of 
freshness after use  
4 hours Up to 1 
hour of 
freshness 
Up to 12 
hours of 
freshness 
5 hours 12 
hours 
.568 .843 
 
 
Figure 3: Explanations for participants' estimates (hours of freshness, mouthwash)
 
 
‘Personal experience’ featured most heavily in participants’ explanations. A typical response 
in this category would include ‘It’s how long my usual mouthwash lasts’. 1 in 5 participants 
also based their estimates on ‘claims seen in other advertisements’. An example of a typical 
response in this category would be ‘That is roughly what most advertisers say they last’. 
Guesses were common and two types of guess were identified. ‘Pure guesses’ were those 
who simply responded, for example ‘I don’t know’ or ‘it was a guess’. ‘Calculated guesses’ 
involved some attempt at rational estimation, for example ‘I'm guessing that the effect would 
last until the next meal’. A relatively small number claimed to base their estimate on the 
quality of the product pictured.  ‘Quality judgements’ such as ‘Looks cheap’ or ‘looks good’ 
accounted for 8% of total estimates.  
 
What is interesting about these responses is the absence of any acknowledgement of the 
influence of the anchor on the adjacent product. In fact, participants did not mention the 
adjacent product at all across the two conditions. This would suggest that respondents were 
overall unaware of the bias exerted on their estimates by the adjacent anchoring claim, 
presented on the can of deodorant. 
 
4.4. Selective Accessibility Effects between Products in the Same Category (H4)  
We tested our null hypothesis of ‘no difference’ against our hypothesis that when shown a 
product and asked to estimate one of its properties, participants’ estimates would be biased 
towards prominent relevant numbers on adjacent products. We did so in the same manner as 
for H3. The only difference was that the two products were in the same category (body 
lotions) and the claim on the adjacent product was relevant. Responses in the high anchoring 
condition were considerably above those in the low anchor condition, and the difference 
between the groups was highly statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U=528; two tailed 
p=<.001; n=53 in each group). Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis.  
 
 
  
 
 Table 5: Summary statistics, Hypothesis 4 
 
Figure 4 shows the five types of justification for estimates identified (n=53 in each group).  
‘Pure guesses’ accounted for 34% of responses across both groups. Examples of such 
answers include ‘don’t know’ or ‘I don't usually use those things so just a guess’. 
‘Comparison with adjacent product’ was the second most diffuse response type reported. 
These answers were those that directly referenced the adjacent product. In some cases these 
respondents simply offered the same value as the adjacent product with a justification being 
‘Would be similar to Saints Treatment’, while others appeared to take the anchor as a starting 
point and adjust away from it to arrive at their answer. One such response was ‘it does not 
look as good quality as the one on the left so think would only last half as long’. ‘Calculated 
guesses’ demonstrated some attempt at deduction, for example ‘some people have 2 showers 
or baths a day so would expect at least 12 hours’. Some 18.9% drew upon their ‘personal 
experience’ of using moisturisers, such as ‘as soon as you get dressed and go out skin goes 
back to normal’ or ‘Because my own lasts a long time’. Finally a few respondents (3.8%) 
offered ‘quality judgements’ on the packaging by way of explanation, for example ‘it doesn't 
make any special claims and it looks cheap’. 
 
Figure 4: Explanations for participants' estimates (hours of hydration, body lotion) 
 
 
            Anchors          Medians  Transformed medians  
 Calibration 
median 
Low 
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Low  
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Low           
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Question        
Body lotion: 
Number of hours 
hydration after use 
5hr  1hr 24hr 2hr 12hr .117 .725 
 
 
4.5. Selective Accessibility vs. Attitude Change Theories In Relation To Exaggerated 
Anchors (H5)  
We tested a null hypothesis of ‘no difference’ against our hypothesis that, when shown a 
product and asked to estimate one of its properties, participants’ estimates would be biased 
towards relevant, but improbably extreme claims on the packaging. Results showed that 
while estimates in the high anchor condition of our experiment were higher than in the low 
condition, the difference fell just short of statistical significance (Mann-Whitney U=1107.5; 
two tailed p=.06; n=53 in each group). Therefore, the null hypothesis is retained.  
 
Table 6: Summary statistics, Hypothesis 5 
 
The characteristics of this ‘threshold’ result means further research is needed in order to 
position the finding squarely in the theoretical debates. A clear conclusion is difficult, not 
only because the finding is insufficiently significant to uphold the selective accessibility 
view, which has shown biases even for extreme anchors (Strack and Mussweiler, 1997), but 
also because the results do not show evidence for the alternative ‘attitude change’ model 
(Wegener et al., 2001). In our experiment the ‘21-hour’ mean estimate was the highest (3.98 
hours). Moreover, the mean in the 7 hour condition (2.5 hours) was in fact slightly lower than 
the calibration ‘no anchor’ group (2.8 hours). According to the attitude change model, we 
would anticipate the estimates in the more plausible anchor group to be higher than estimates 
in the extreme condition, which was not the case.   
 
Content effects may partly explain the relatively high calibration group estimates. The group 
was not a pure control condition because, unlike the high and low groups, participants were 
not required to consider the believability of the claim before estimating. However, LeBoeuf 
and Shafir (2009) found that even forewarnings about anchors do not eliminate biases, 
suggesting this may not be a complete account.  
 
Certainly, it does not explain why the bias between the high and low conditions fell short of 
significance. This outcome is surprising given the low anchor was more relevant to the 
question compared to H3 and H4 in which biases were found. A credible rationalisation is 
that there is simply little scope for anchoring biases for product claims when the range of 
plausible answers is very small (i.e. an energy drink is unlikely to lift energy for more than a 
couple of hours, while moisturisers may conceivably hydrate skin for 12 or even 24 hours). 
We have also observed that variance (and standard deviation) for responses to the energy 
drink question was lower than for all other questions across all groups, and therefore possibly 
resilient to manipulation. This would be in accordance with research connecting uncertainty 
with heightened bias (Van Exel et al., 2006). If this is the case, the experiment might produce 
significant effects using different products or claims. 
 
              Anchors               Medians  
 Calibration 
median 
Low 
anchor 
High 
anchor 
Low  
anchor 
High  
anchor 
Question      
Energy drink: Hours of 
increased energy for 
the average person 
2hr 7hr 21hr 2hr 2hr 
 
 
However, a closer inspection of the data suggests that the extremely high anchor may have 
engendered some influence on estimates. Figure 5 shows that even though participants 
generally found the implausible 21-hour claim to be less believable than the 7-hour claim, 
their estimates tended to be higher regardless of believability ratings. In total 43% of 
participants found the 7-hour claim (low anchor) either somewhat or completely improbable, 
and this increased to 62% for the 21-hour (high anchor) claim. At the same time, the mean 
estimate was quite consistently above the high anchor condition regardless of whether 
participants judged the claim believable or not. The relatively consistent pattern presented in 
Figure 5 and the closeness of the result to significance, indicates further research is warranted 
into implausible product claims. 
 
Figure 4: Believability ratings and mean estimates for the Ammo Energy Drink advertising claim 
 
Note: Only one person in each group selected ‘completely believable’, limiting the relevance of this 
average. 
 
4.6. Moderating Factors 
Possible relationships between anchoring biases and four variables were tested. These 
included advertising scepticism levels, product usage frequency, age and gender. 
 
For questions where an anchoring bias was observed, we tested whether advertising 
scepticism was correlated with the degree of anchoring bias. After transforming the estimates 
for the questions in which anchoring effects were observed into percentiles of the calibration 
group estimates, a Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient was calculated to observe 
whether participants’ scepticism scores would reflect this trend. In fact, while this pattern was 
observed in most cases, no statistically significant correlations were found. Across the two 
questions, the mean correlations for high anchors and advertising scepticism were r =-0.05, 
n=53, two tailed p=0.51. For low anchors they were r =0.15, n=53, two tailed p=0.31.  
 
 
 
Applying the same methodology we tested whether usage frequency of the products was 
correlated with the degree of anchoring bias among our participants, in cases where 
anchoring biases were observed. Again, if anchoring biases are stronger among those with 
low scores (in our case low product usage frequency), the correlation between estimates 
(transformed into percentiles of the calibration group responses) and product usage should be 
negative in the high anchor group and positive in the low anchor groups. This pattern was 
observed for the body lotion, but the correlation was not significant. For the mouthwash the 
correlation between product usage and anchoring estimates was significant in the high anchor 
condition, but it was a positive correlation (in the opposite direction than had been 
anticipated). The low anchor condition finding for the mouthwash was in the expected 
direction but was not significant. Overall no significant correlation between product usage 
frequency and anchoring bias was found. Across the two questions, the mean correlations for 
high anchors and product usage frequency were r =0.10, n=53, two tailed p=0.16. For low 
anchors they were r=0.19, n=53, p=0.18.  
 
Our sample was closely matched to the age profile of the UK population as reported by the 
Office for National Statistics (2011). The Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient was calculated 
between age (year of birth, provided by the survey company with participants’ authorisation) 
and participants’ transformed estimates. If anchoring biases are stronger among older 
participants (i.e. those with lower birth year values), the correlation between estimates and 
age should be negative in the high anchor group and positive in the low anchor groups; or 
vice versa if younger participants are more vulnerable to biases. While the pattern of results is 
consistent with a correlation between age and anchoring bias, the finding is not significant. 
Across the two questions, mean correlations for high anchors and birth year were r =-0.09, 
n=53, two tailed p=0.51. For low anchors they were r=0.10, n=53, two tailed p=0.46.  
 
The experimental groups comprised near equal numbers of men and women (52% m, 48% f). 
In the high anchor condition there were 28 males and 25 females. In the low anchor condition 
there were 27 males and 26 females (n=106). The results of a Mann-Whitney U test did not 
show any significant difference between gender groups’ estimates for either question. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The results of the hypotheses are as set out below in Table 7. Significant results (p=<.05) are 
in bold. 
 
Table 7: Overview of findings, Hypotheses 1-5 
Hypothesis n (per group) Target of estimate Mann-Whitney U P (two tailed) 
1 53 Expected price of a table lamp 1244 .31 
2 53 Grams of sugar in a glass of 
lemonade 
1293 .48 
3 53 Hours of freshness after use, 
mouthwash  
990 .006 
4 53 Hours of hydration after use, 
body lotion  
528 <.001 
5 53 Energy lift, hours (energy drink)  1108 .06 
 
 
This paper aimed to contribute to under-researched non-price anchoring research, and 
investigated how bias in advertising and product information contexts may affect the 
consumer decision making process. We were unable to find evidence of simple numeric 
priming effects on price estimates. Participants’ estimates about how much they would expect 
to pay for a lamp were unaffected by a prominent numerical claim about the wattage of the 
light bulb. Moreover, participants’ explanations did not mention the abstract number. 
 
Similarly, our investigation into simple numeric priming and irrelevant product information 
found no evidence that entirely irrelevant numbers on products can engender biases. A soda 
bottle label advertising the number of prizes to be won did not influence estimates about 
sugar content. Furthermore, participants did not mention the irrelevant number in their 
explanations. 
 
Contrastingly, semantic priming effects between products in different categories were very 
strong. Estimates about how long a mouthwash would keep participants’ feeling fresh were 
significantly higher when the neighbouring deodorant promised ‘up to 12 hours of freshness’ 
compared to ‘1 hour’. Importantly, participants’ explanations did not indicate they were 
aware of the adjacent claim, suggesting the effect was subconscious. 
 
Semantic anchoring effects were very strong between adjacent products in the same category. 
The strongest biases were observed between two body lotions, using a semantically linked 
claim. When participants were asked to estimate how many hours a pictured body lotion 
would hydrate their skin, their answers moved significantly towards the number of ‘hours of 
hydration’ promised on an adjacent competing brand. In their explanations, over 25% 
indicated they had adjusted their estimates based on the neighbouring product’s claim.  
 
Furthermore, the effect of exaggerated anchors was tested. We did not observe a strong bias 
when the anchor was highly implausible. Estimates about how many hours a can of energy 
drink would lift energy were not significantly higher when the claim read ‘Lifts energy for up 
to 21 hours’ compared to when it read ‘7 hours’, suggesting participants were not influenced 
by the claim overall. However, the result of this experiment came very close to statistical 
significance (p=.06), implying further research into exaggerated claims is warranted. 
 
Biases were very resilient where found. There was no indication that those holding more 
sceptical attitudes towards advertising were less biased. Nor did usage frequency of similar 
products or participant age correlate with bias. No significant difference between male and 
female estimates was observed.  
 
5.1. Implications  
The findings are suggestive of important possible conditions governing the effectiveness of 
anchors in product advertising contexts. Regulators might feel cautiously reassured that 
simple numeric priming is unlikely to be a viable form of manipulative advertising, since 
abstract anchors did not influence willingness to pay or estimates about product 
characteristics.    
 
The most promising opportunity lies in semantic anchoring and semantic priming. The results 
have shown that when attempting to make estimates about products, our participants appeared 
to treat similar (though not necessarily relevant) information on adjacent products as 
reference points to aid guessing. This is interesting from the marketer perspective since it 
demonstrates how product information and advertising claims are evaluated relatively rather 
 
 
than at face value. Moreover, it raises the prospect that a bold claim may ‘rub off’ on adjacent 
products by anchoring consumers’ expectations to it. Thereby an inferior product could be 
perceived more effective than it would otherwise.   
 
While the findings do not challenge the imperative to present product claims, they may have 
implications for shelf positioning. For example, generic or own-label brands may in fact 
benefit from being positioned adjacent to leading brands if the anchoring effect renders it 
more likely that they are perceived a ‘close second’.   
 
Likewise it may be advantageous to differentiate wording from competing brands. 
Semantically distinct advertising claims may disrupt the mental shortcut associated with 
semantic anchoring biases (Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). Brands may even seek to adopt 
proprietary words in order to effectively copyright advertising claims. Alternatively, generic 
brands may seek to model their claim language on the market leader. Such considerations 
may be worthy of incorporation into brand identity building, provided the findings can be 
consistently repeated.   
 
Another possible implication relates to the plausibility of claims. While some research 
suggests that even improbable anchoring values can bias estimates (Chapman and Johnson, 
1994; Northcraft and Neale, 1987), we were unable to demonstrate this. This calls into 
question the advertising practice of asserting implausible claims, using carefully worded 
phrases such as ‘up to’ to legally mislead consumers (BBC News Online, 2011). However, 
the near significance of this finding requires further research, before a definitive conclusion 
can be reached concerning such claims.   
 
What is of potential public concern is that biases appear quite resilient to individual factors 
that might be expected to limit them. Consumers might be surprised that advertising 
scepticism levels were not significantly correlated with lower bias levels. Neither was 
experience of using similar products. Consumer groups may have a role to play in educating 
shoppers about biases, and could encourage mitigating strategies. For example, it would be 
worth exploring whether the ‘consider the opposite’ method (Mussweiler et al., 2000), might 
reduce biases. Of course this is only relevant in cases where participants are aware of the 
anchor, which, as we have seen, is not always the case. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Respondents were presented with a fictitious catalogue cut-out of the ‘Luminosity Table 
Lamp’. The only information given was the name of the product and a prominent irrelevant 
statement containing our anchor: ‘60 watt bulb included’ in the high condition and ‘10 watt 
bulb included’ in the low condition. They were asked how much they would expect to pay for 
it (in GBP) if they saw it in a department store.   
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Respondents were presented a bottle of fictitious ‘Juicy Lemon and Lime Drink’ and asked to 
estimate how many grams of sugar a small glass of the drink contains. Our anchor was an 
irrelevant promotion on the label which read ‘86 prizes to be won’ in the high condition and 
‘2 prizes to be won’ in the low condition.  
 
Hypothesis 3: 
Respondents were presented a can of fictitious ‘Soul Fresh’ deodorant beside a bottle of 
‘Aquasonic’ mouthwash. They were asked how many hours they would expect the 
mouthwash to keep their mouth feeling fresh after use. An anchor was added to the adjacent 
deodorant. This was ‘Up to 12 hours of freshness’ in the high anchor condition and ‘Up to 1 
hour of freshness’ in the low condition.  
 
Hypothesis 4: 
A similar scenario as Hypothesis 3 was presented to respondents. The only difference was 
that the two products were in the same category (body lotions) and the claim on the adjacent 
product was relevant. In the high anchor condition the claim ‘Up to 24 hours hydration’ was 
included on a bottle of fictitious ‘Saint’s Treatments Total Body Moisturiser’. In the low 
anchor condition this was ‘Up to 1 hour of hydration’. Respondents were asked to estimate 
how many hours the adjacent ‘HomeSpa Intense moisture lotion’ would hydrate the skin after 
one application.  
 
Hypothesis 5: 
Respondents were presented a can of fictitious ‘Ammo’ energy drink. On it was the claim 
‘Lifts energy for up to 7 hours’ (low anchor) or ‘up to 21 hours’ (high anchor). Since this was 
a test of implausible claims compared to high but more plausible claims, the low anchor was 
set at the 90th percentile of the calibration group responses (the same as the high anchor 
group percentile in H1-H4) and three times higher than this value for the implausibly high 
anchor. In addition to testing for difference between the two experimental conditions, 
calibration group responses were used to gauge the relative effectiveness of the two claims 
compared to ‘no anchor’.  
 
In high and low conditions, respondents were explicitly asked to consider the anchor value. 
This was necessary to verify whether respondents found the anchor improbable, by declaring 
on a five-point scale (from ‘Completely believable to Completely unbelievable’) how they 
felt about the claim that the energy drink lifts energy for up to 7 or 21 hours respectively. 
This also ensured that respondents knew they were expected to critically appraise the anchor 
rather than simply enter the claim value as their estimate in the follow up question. 
Respondents were then asked to estimate how many hours they would expect a drink like 
‘Ammo’ to lift energy levels on average.  
 
